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Health Claims Regulation: Balancing
Commercial Free Speech and Consumer
Protection
Sarah E. Losht

INTRODUCTION
The manufacturer of a dietary supplement claims that its
product reduces the risk of Alzheimer's disease. Assuming the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates such claims, a
consumer relies on the claim and purchases the product,
forsaking a trip to the doctor. Unbeknownst to the consumer,
only one-third of the existing research supports the
manufacturer's claim and only to a minimal extent. The FDA
attempted to use its statutory authority to force the
manufacturer to adjust the wording of its claim to more
adequately reflect the strength of the evidence, but a court
struck down such an attempt as a violation of the
manufacturer's commercial free speech rights. In the end, the
consumer wasted money on a product and failed to seek medical
attention in reliance on an unfounded health claim because he
believed the FDA regulated the truth of such claims.
This example highlights the tension between the FDA's
regulation of health claims on food products and dietary
supplements, manufacturers' commercial free speech rights to
make such claims, and the resulting impact on consumers.
Congress has tasked the FDA with the regulation and
prevention of misbranded food.1 The Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act (NLEA) amended the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), permitting the FDA to regulate health
claims on food products and dietary supplements. 2 The FDA
t BA 2009, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; JD Candidate 2014, The
University of Chicago Law School.
1 See 21 USC § 343.
2 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, Pub L No 101-535, 104 Stat 2353 (1990),
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permits manufacturers to make health claims-such as "green
tea reduces risk of breast cancer"-if the agency has found
significant scientific agreement supporting the claim. 3 If,
however, the FDA concludes the claim is not supported by
sufficient evidence and is potentially misleading, the agency
requires the manufacturer to add a disclaimer to accurately
convey the limitations of the scientific support. 4 Lastly, if the
evidence is so one-sided as to make the claim inherently
misleading, the FDA may ban the claim in its entirety.5
Manufacturers challenge the regulation of health claims
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and under the
First Amendment. First, when the FDA completely suppresses
the claim, manufacturers urge the court to review and overturn
the FDA's evaluation of the scientific evidence under the APA's
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.6 While courts
invoke the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard in
name, some actually apply a heightened standard and replace
the FDA's technical expertise with their own judgment of the
scientific evidence. This Comment argues that in applying an
inappropriately heightened review, courts interfere with the
statutory scheme and inhibit the FDA from fulfilling its mission
of providing accurate information to consumers. Second, when
the FDA permits the health claim but requires an accompanying
disclaimer, manufacturers challenge the language of the
disclaimer under the First Amendment: manufacturers claim
the disclaimer infringes on their First Amendment commercial
free speech rights, while the FDA reiterates its statutory
mandate to prevent consumer fraud and protect the public
health via regulation of these claims.'
The DC Circuit is the only court of appeals to have
examined the regulation of health claims.8 In Pearson v Shalala

codified at 21 USC § 301, 321, 337, 343, 343-1, 345, 371.
3 See 21 CFR § 101.14(c).
See Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry: Qualified Health
Claims in the Labeling of Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements; Availability, 67
Fed Reg 78002, 78003 (2002).
5 See Pearson v Shalala, 164 F3d 650, 655 (1999) ("Pearson F').
6 See, for example, Whitaker v Thompson, 248 F Supp 2d 1, 2 (DDC 2002).
7 See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, HR 3562, 101st Cong, 2d Sess, in 136
Cong Rec 33426 (Oct 24, 1990) (discussing the FDA's role in protecting consumers).
8 See Pearson 1, 164 F3d 650.
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("Pearson I')9, a dietary supplement manufacturer challenged
the FDA's rejection of its proposed health claims.10 The court
held that although disclosure is preferred over suppression, the
FDA may ban health claims where it determines that the
evidence against the claim outweighs the evidence supporting
the claim." Further, the FDA's conclusions regarding the
strength of the scientific evidence are reviewed under an
arbitrary and capricious standard.12 The district courts that
have since applied Pearson I have drawn narrower and
sometimes conflicting conclusions. Some have applied a
heightened review to the APA claims, which frustrates the
FDA's ability to ban claims it deems unsupported by credible
evidence. Other district courts find more claims to be potentially
rather than inherently misleading, however, the courts have yet
to approve a qualifying disclaimer that the FDA has proposed.
Since Pearson I, the FDA has clarified its Guidelines for
evaluating scientific evidencel 3 and has proposed modified
disclaimers of varying specificity and detail.14 Nonetheless,
courts continue to overturn the FDA's scientific conclusions and
reject the modified disclaimers, restricting the FDA's ability to
fulfill its mandate. 15 Consumers are the ultimate losers in this
battle. When the courts prevent the FDA from exercising its
technical expertise to evaluate the strength of the scientific
evidence and its authority to require informative disclaimers,
this leaves the FDA without the capacity to prevent misleading
health claims and inform consumers.
This Comment proposes an interpretation of Pearson I that
respects manufacturers' commercial free speech rights to make
health claims while permitting the FDA to fulfill its mandate of
protecting the public health and preventing consumer fraud via
disclaimers on those claims. Part I details the FDA's statutory
authority to regulate health claims, the legislative purpose in
granting the FDA this enforcement authority, and the

9

164 F3d 650 (DC Cir 1999).

1o See id at 651-52.
n

See id at 659 n 10.

See id at 660.
See 67 Fed Reg at 78003 (cited in note 4).
14 See, for example, Alliance for Natural Health US v Sebelius, 714 F Supp 2d 48,
70-72 (DDC 2010) ("Alliance 1").
15 See id.
12

13
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commercial free speech doctrine. Part II highlights the
development of health claims regulation in the courts, beginning
in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals and then in subsequent
district courts. 16 Part III discusses the problems resulting from
the inconsistent interpretations of the district courts. Part IV.A
analyzes the heightened review some district courts apply to
overturn the FDA's conclusions about the weight of the scientific
evidence. This Part proposes that courts should apply the
deferential arbitrary and capricious review and not conflate the
APA and constitutional claims. Part IV.B suggests that, for
potentially misleading
claims, by first permitting the
manufacturer to make a concise and specific claim and then
incorporating language the DC Circuit suggested into its
disclaimers, the FDA can preserve its enforcement power over
health claims without infringing upon commercial free speech.
I. BACKGROUND

A.

Statutory Framework

In 1990, Congress passed the NLEA, amending the FDCA to
permit the FDA to regulate health claims on food labels." A
health claim is defined as:
any claim made on the label or in labeling of a food,
including a dietary supplement, that expressly or by
implication, including "third party" references, written
statements (e.g., a brand name including a term such as
"heart"), symbols (e.g., a heart symbol), or vignettes,
characterizes the relationship of any substance to a
disease or health-related condition. 8
Prior to enactment of the NLEA, foods bearing a health
claim were subject to the strenuous new drug application (NDA)
process.19 The NLEA created a "safe harbor" from this lengthy

16 See, for example, Fleminger, Inc v United States
Department of Health and
Human Services, 854 F Supp 2d 192 (D Conn 2012); PearsonI, 164 F 3d at 650.
17
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, Pub L No 101-535, 104 Stat 2353 (1990),
codified at 21 USC § 301, 321, 337, 343, 343-1, 345, 371.
1
21 CFR § 101.14.
19 See 21 USC
§ 355. The NDA process requires manufacturers to submit
information to the FDA regarding the proposed drug's safety and efficacy, proposed
labeling, methods of manufacturing and quality control, results of clinical and animal
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drug certification process for dietary supplements and food
products advertising health benefits. 20 A product escapes the
NDA process if the FDA approves its health claim under 21 USC
§ 343(r), which specifies what qualities make a food
"misbranded" and details the limitations on health claims. 2 1 A
manufacturer must present evidence supporting its health claim
to the FDA for review before the claim may be used in labeling. 22
The drafters of the NLEA advocated two goals in enacting
these amendments--consumer protection and public health. 23
Prior to 1984, health claims were regulated as new drugs under
the NDA process. 24 However, relaxed enforcement during the
Reagan administration led to a rise in unregulated claims on
food products in the 1980s. As a result, companies began making
claims that had not been approved under the NDA process, yet
the FDA brought very few enforcement actions. 25 Senator Henry
Waxman, one of the authors of the bill, cited this lack of
enforcement as the basis for proposing the NLEA: "[W]hen the
FDA relaxed enforcement of regulations during the early years
of the Reagan administration, it lost control of the
marketplace . .. This bill will recognize the marketplace so that

only truthful claims may be made on foods." 2 6 When debating
the bill, House Floor Managers noted the "great potential for

tests, and a myriad of other documentation. See Food and Drug Administration, New
Drug Application (NDA), (May 18, 2012), online at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplicatio
ns/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (visited Sept 15, 2012).
20 See Pearson1, 164 F3d at 652.
21 See 21 USC § 343(r)(3)(B)(iii), which
establishes:
A regulation . . . shall require such claim to be stated in a manner so that the
claim is an accurate representation ... and so that the claim enables the public
to comprehend the information provided in the claim and to understand the
relative significance of such information in the context of a total daily diet.
See 21 CFR §§ 101.14(d)-(e), 101.70.
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, HR 3562, 101st Cong, 2d Sess, in 136
Cong Rec 33426 (Oct 24, 1990). See also Food and Drug Administration, Food Labeling;
General Requirements for Health Claims for Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed Reg 33700,
33701 (1993) ("Congress enacted the health claims provisions of the 1990 amendments to
help U.S. consumers maintain healthy dietary practices and to protect these consumers
from unfounded health claims.").
24 See 58 Fed Reg at 33702 (cited in note 23).
25 See
id.
26 See id, citing Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of
1990, HR 3562, 101st
Cong, 2d Sess (Oct 31, 1989), in 136 Cong Rec H 12951-02, 12953 (Oct 20, 1990).
22
23
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defrauding consumers if food is sold that contains inaccurate or
unsupportable health claims." 2 7
Congressional debate on the 1990 amendments to the FDCA
also focused on the "goal of improvement of the public health
through use of valid and understandable claims in food
labeling." 28 Congressman Edward Madigan, one of the authors of
the bill, highlighted recent scientific evidence linking good
health to dietary habits, which reinforced the importance of
providing consumers with accurate information about the food
they consume. 29 He also noted that the amendments "[strike] the
right balance in providing consumers with information, without
being overly burdensome on industry."30 This statement shows
of the potential burden on
congressional awareness
manufacturers and intent to balance that burden with the goal
of consumer protection under the NLEA.
Lastly, Congressman Waxman noted the importance of
scientifically valid information to achieving the goals of
consumer protection and improved public health. 31 The FDA
evaluates the strength and credibility of scientific evidence
supporting health claims. 32 The agency authorizes claims in
their entirety as an unqualified health claim when:
it determines, based on the totality of publicly available
scientific evidence (including evidence from well-designed
studies conducted in a manner which is consistent with
generally recognized scientific procedures and principles),
that there is significant scientific agreement, among
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate such claims, that the claim is supported by such
evidence. 33
Initially, the FDA did not specify what met the
qualifications of significant scientific agreement (SSA). 34 After
See 58 Fed Reg at 33702 (cited in note 23).
Id.
29 See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, HR 3562, 101st Cong, 2d Sess, in 136
Cong Rec 20421 (July 30, 1990).
0 See id.
21 See 58 Fed Reg at 33702 (cited in note 23).
12 See 21 CFR § 101.14(c).
27
28

3
34

21 CFR § 101.14(c) (emphasis added).
See 58 Fed Reg at 2478-2501, 2506 (cited in note 23) ("FDA is not now
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the DC Circuit required clarification of SSA in Pearson I,35 the
FDA released Guidelines explaining significant scientific
agreement. 36 A finding of SSA requires "the agency's best
judgment as to whether qualified experts would likely agree that
the scientific evidence
supports the substance/disease
relationship that is the subject of a proposed health claim." 37
The Guidelines note that SSA is "intended to be a strong
standard that provides a high level of confidence in the validity
of the substance/disease relationship" and equates it closest to
"consensus" on the spectrum of scientific evidence. 38
The FDA considers claims that do not meet the SSA
standard as potential qualified health claims.3 9 The agency
evaluates the evidence supporting the claim to determine if it is
inherently misleading and thus banned under 21 USC § 343(r)
or, alternatively, if "a credible body of scientific data support[s]
the claim."4 0 The test for qualified claims is less stringent than
the level of SSA for unqualified claims, instead asking whether
the weight of scientific evidence supports the claim-"whether

prescribing a specific set, type, or number of studies as being necessary to support a
health claim. The agency will consider all relevant data on a topic, including clinical
studies, epidemiological data, and animal studies.").
3
Pearson I, 164 F3d at 653-54.
3
See Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry: Evidence-Based
Review System for the Scientific Evaluation of Health Claims-Final§ I (Jan 2009), online
at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatorylnform
ationlLabelingNutrition/ucm073332.htm (visited Sept 15, 2013) ("Guidelines"). The
Guidelines state:
The specific topics addressed in this guidance document are: (1) identifying
studies that evaluate the substance/disease relationship, (2) identifying
surrogate endpoints for disease risk, (3) evaluating the human studies to
determine whether scientific conclusions can be drawn from them about the
substance/disease relationship, (4) assessing the methodological quality of each
human study from which scientific conclusions about the substance/disease
relationship can be drawn, (5) evaluating the totality of scientific evidence, (6)
assessing significant scientific agreement, (7) specificity of claim language for
qualified health claims, and (8) reevaluation of existing SSA or qualified health
claims.
Id.
Id at § III.G.
Id.
39 See generally Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry: Qualified
Health Claims in the Labeling of Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements;
Availability, 67 Fed Reg 78002-01 (2002). The FDA divided regulation of health claims
into qualified and unqualified claims after Whitaker v Thompson, 248 F Supp 2d 1 (DDC
2002).
40 67 Fed Reg at 78003 (cited in note 39).
3

38
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the pertinent data and information presented in those studies is
sufficiently scientifically persuasive." 4 1 For claims meeting this
test, the FDA permits the claim so long as it uses appropriate
qualifying language reflecting the strength of the scientific
evidence and remaining degree of uncertainty. 42
B.

Commercial Free Speech Doctrine

Courts evaluate FDA regulation of health claims under the
commercial free speech doctrine. 43 While commercial speech is
protected under the First Amendment, it is given less protection
and is subject to greater regulatory infringement than other
modes of noncommercial speech. 44 Central Hudson Gas &

Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York 45
established the framework for evaluating potential infringement
of commercial free speech. 46 The multi-step test begins with a
determination of whether the commercial speech is unlawful or
misleading, and if so, it is not protected under the First
Amendment. 47 If the speech "is lawful and not misleading or is
only potentially misleading, the [c]ourt must ask whether the
asserted governmental interest in regulating the speech is
substantial."48 If the interest is not substantial, the government
Id.
See id.
43 See Pearson I, 164 F3d at 655, citing Bolger v Youngs Drug Products Corp, 463
US 60, 67-68 (1983) (noting that the combination of the manufacturer's economic
motivation, the reference to a specific product, and the purpose of advertising made the
statements commercial speech).
4
See Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association, 436 US 447, 455-56 (1978), stating:
Expression
41

42

concerning purely commercial transactions has come within the ambit of the
[First] Amendment's protection only recently.... [W]e [] have afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.
Id. For more information on the level of scrutiny applied to commercial speech, see
generally Samantha Rauer, When the First Amendment and Public Health Collide: The
Court's Increasingly Strict Constitutional Scrutiny of Health Regulations that Restrict
Commercial Speech, 38 Am J L and Med 690 (2012).
45 447 US 557 (1980).
46 See id at 566.
4
Thompson v Western States Medical Center, 535 US 357, 367 (2002).
4
Fleminger, Inc v United States Department of Health and Human Services, 854 F
Supp 2d 192, 195 (D Conn 2012), quoting Western States, 535 US at 367 (internal
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cannot infringe the speech. If the interest is substantial, the
court next considers "whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted." 49 Lastly, the court asks
"whether [the regulation] is not more extensive than necessary
to serve that interest."5 0
The last step has an additional evaluation of whether there
is a reasonable fit between the means chosen to accomplish the
end and the end itself.5 1 At the time of Pearson I, the Supreme
Court did not define "reasonable fit" to mean the least restrictive
option but merely required that the "regulation not burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interests." 52 The Supreme Court has
since clarified that "[ilf the Government could achieve its
interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that
restricts less speech, the Government must do so."53 The
government has the burden of demonstrating that the
restrictions "that it seeks to impose are not more extensive than
is necessary to serve the interests it attempts to advance." 54
Members of Congress had this framework in mind when
they helped enact the NLEA; after a notice and comment period,
the FDA responded to comments on the proposed statute, citing
the Central Hudson framework.55 Congress also acknowledged
that "regulation of food labeling would be impossible if the
Government could not restrict speech"5 6 and that "[flreedom of
[s]peech does not include the freedom to violate the labeling
provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act."5 7

quotations omitted).
4
Western States, 535 US at 367, quoting Central Hudson, 447 US at 566.
50 Western States, 535 US at 367, quoting Central Hudson,
447 US at 566.
51 PearsonI, 164 F3d at 656.
52 Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v Fox, 492 US 469, 478
(1989), quoting Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 799 (1989) (quotation marks
omitted).
s3 Western States, 535 US at 371.
5
Alliance for Natural Health US v Sebelius, 786 F Supp 2d 1 (DDC 2011)
("Alliance If'), quoting Western States, 535 US at 371 (quotation marks omitted).
5
See 58 Fed Reg at 2524 (cited in note 23) (responding to comments arguing that
the regulations both do and do not violate manufacturers' First Amendment rights).
56 Id at 2525, citing SEC v Wall Street PublishingInstitute, 851 F2d 365, 373 (DC
Cir 1988).
5
58 Fed Reg at 2525 (cited in note 23), citing United States v Articles of
Food. . . Clover Club Potato Chips, 67 FRD 419, 424 (D Idaho 1975).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW
This Part explores how courts have tackled the
by
presented
problems
regulatory
and
constitutional
health
qualified
to
manufacturers' health claims. Challenges
claims fall under the First Amendment as well as under the
Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary and capricious review.
In addressing the First Amendment challenges, courts apply the
Central Hudson test. The DC Circuit is the only court of appeals
to have addressed this issue in the seminal case, Pearson L5 8 In
subsequent cases, district courts have failed to uniformly apply
Pearson I. The DC Circuit held that disclosure is preferred over
suppression and required disclaimers to rectify potentially
misleading claims.5 9 However, the court also left open the
possibility of complete suppression of inherently misleading
claims where the FDA determines the evidence supporting the
claim is qualitatively weaker than evidence against the claim. 60
District courts have expanded the holding in favor of increased
commercial free speech at the expense of consumer protection by
applying a heightened standard of review to overturn the FDA's
evaluation of the claim's scientific support and misleadingness.
Although the FDA has responded to judicial interpretation of
the NLEA by issuing SSA Guidelines and implementing
disclaimers on health claims, 61 courts continue to substitute
their judgment of the scientific evidence and reject FDA
attempts to exercise regulatory authority via disclaimers.

A. PearsonI
In Pearson I, dietary supplement marketers contested the
FDA's rejection of four health claims printed on their
supplements:
(1) Consumption of antioxidant vitamins may reduce the
risk of certain kinds of cancers.

58 See Pearson 1, 164 F3d at 654 n 4 (noting the Tenth Circuit and Second Circuit
had been presented with general challenges to 21 CFR § 101.14 but failed to rule on the
issue).
'9 See id at 657-59.
6
Id at 659 n 10.
61 See generally Food and Drug Administration, Guidelines (cited in note 36). See,
for example, Alliance for Natural Health u Sebelius, 714 F Supp 2d 48 (DDC 2010).
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(2) Consumption of fiber may reduce the risk of colorectal
cancer.
(3) Consumption of omega-3 fatty acids may reduce the
risk of coronary heart disease.
(4) .8 mg of folic acid in a dietary supplement is more
effective in reducing the risk of neural tube defects than
a lower amount in foods in common form. 62
The FDA rejected the claims, saying the evidence was
"inconclusive" and did not "give rise to significant scientific
agreement."63 The FDA also rejected the manufacturer's
suggestion of a corrective disclaimer, noting that disclaimers
would be "ineffective because there would be a question as to
whether consumers would be able to ascertain which claims
were preliminary [and accompanied by a disclaimer] and which
were not." 64 The government made two arguments supporting its
rejection of disclaimers: (1) that the lack of significant scientific
agreement rendered the claims inherently misleading and, thus,
not protected under the First Amendment; and (2) that even
claims that are only potentially misleading do not merit a
disclaimer if they lack significant scientific agreement.6 5 In
response, plaintiffs challenged the rejected claims under the
APA and the First Amendment. 66
The DC Circuit conceded that the FDA could ban the claims
if they were inherently misleading.6 7 However, the court rejected
the government's first argument that any and all claims lacking
significant scientific agreement would inherently mislead
consumers, calling this a paternalistic assumption because
consumers could still exercise judgment in purchasing

Pearson I, 164 F3d at 651-52. (quotation marks omitted).
Id at 653 (quotation marks omitted).
64 Id at 653-54, quoting Food and Drug Administration, Food Labeling; General
Requirements for Health Claims for Dietary Supplements, 59 Fed Reg 395-01, 405
(1994).
6 See id at 654.
6
PearsonI, 164 F3d at 655.
67 See id at 655, quoting In re RMJ, 455 US 191, 203 (1982) ("[W]hen the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when
experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may
impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.").
62

6
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supplements. 68 The court evaluated the government's second
argument under Central Hudson.69 For the first prong-whether
the government interest was substantial-the court held that
the government interest in "ensuring the accuracy of commercial
information in the marketplace"7 0 and "promoting the health,
[was] undeniable."7 1
safety, and welfare of its citizens ...
However, the court rejected the argument under the next
the
directly advanced
the regulation
prong-whether
72
so.
of
doing
substantial interest and was a reasonable means
The court respected the FDA's evaluation of the scientific
evidence, noting the logical determination that studies linking
foods with certain dietary components to reduction of a disease
did not necessarily transfer to a dietary supplement with that
component. 73 Nonetheless, the court reiterated that "disclaimers
[were] constitutionally preferable to outright suppression" 74 and
required that the FDA consider disclaimers to rectify the
ambiguity or deceptiveness in any potentially misleading
claims.75

The FDA also expressed general concern to the court that
consumers might assume health claims on labels were approved
by the government, due to the extensive regulation of the sale of
food and drugs. 76 The court responded with an "obvious
answer: .. . requir[ing] the label to state 'The FDA does not

68

Pearson1, 164 F3d at 655.

69

Id at 656-57.

Id at 656, quoting Edenfield v Fane, 507 US 761, 769 (1993) (quotation marks
omitted).
71 Pearson I, 164 F3d at 656, quoting Rubin v Coors Brewing Co, 514 US 476, 485
(1995) (internal quotations omitted).
72 PearsonI, 164 F3d at 656 ("[I]t surely cannot be said that this notion-which the
government does not even dare openly to set forth-is a direct pursuit of consumer
health; it would seem a rather indirect route, to say the least.").
7
Id at 658.
7
Id at 657, citing Peel v Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of
Illinois, 496 US 91, 110 (1990).
' PearsonI, 164 F3d at 658-59 (proposing disclaimer language: (1) "The evidence is
inconclusive because existing studies have been performed with foods containing
antioxidant vitamins, and the effect of those foods on reducing the risk of cancer may
result from other components in those foods;" and (2) '"The evidence in support of this
claim is inconclusive.").
76 Id at
659.
7o
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approve this claim."'7 7 The court remanded the case for the FDA
to reconsider the proposed health claims.78
In sum, Pearson I established the groundwork for
evaluating a First Amendment challenge to the FDA's
regulation of qualified health claims. The DC Circuit was
skeptical that the proposed claims were inherently misleading in
this instance but left the door open to the complete ban of a
claim "where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by
evidence against a claim" or "where evidence in support of the
claim is qualitatively weaker than evidence against the claimfor example, where the claim rests on only one or two old
studies." 9 The court focused on the reasonable fit between the
manner of restriction and the government's interest by
mandating that the FDA consider corrective disclaimers rather
than outright suppression of potentially misleading claims.8 0
While the court required clarification of the standards the FDA
applied in evaluating the scientific evidence, it deferred to the
agency's evaluation of the scientific studies for three of the four
proposed claims.8 1
B.

Applications of PearsonI in the District Courts

This Part describes the six cases interpreting Pearson L
Each case steps further from the original Pearson I holding,
giving less deference to the FDA's conclusions of the scientific
evidence and eventually straying from the APA's arbitrary and
capricious review to an unfounded "independent" review. The
most recent court interpreting Pearson I, the District Court for
the District of Connecticut, finally struck a balance between
deferring to the FDA's scientific conclusions and permitting
disclaimer language that accurately reflected the strength of the
scientific evidence. 82

7
7

Id.

Id at 661.

7
Pearson I, 164 F3d at 659 & n 10.
8 Id at 657.
81 See id at 658-59 (agreeing with the FDA's conclusion regarding the studies for
the first three claims but disagreeing that a credible study supported the fourth claim).
82 See Fleminger, Inc v United States Department of Health and Human
Services,

854 F Supp 2d 192, 211, 216-17 (D Conn 2012).
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PearsonII.

In response to Pearson I, the FDA requested submissions of
scientific data regarding the Pearson I plaintiffs' proposed
health claims. 83 The FDA also followed the DC Circuit's order to
define SSA and released a draft of industry Guidelines
explaining the FDA's evaluation process for scientific evidence. 84
Eighteen months after Pearson I, the FDA again refused to
authorize plaintiffs' four proposed claims, deeming them
"inherently misleading." This time, however, the FDA proposed
alternative claims it would be willing to accept, such as:
Healthful diets with adequate folate may reduce a
woman's risk of having a child with a brain or spinal cord
birth defect. The scientific evidence that 400 mcg folic
acid daily reduces the risk of such defects is stronger
than the evidence for the effectiveness of lower amounts.
This is because most such tests have not looked at
amounts less than 400 mcg folic acid daily.8 5
Plaintiffs rejected the alternative claims and filed suit for
First Amendment and APA violations.8 6

In Pearson v Shalala ("Pearson II'),87 the district court
followed Pearson l's application of the Central Hudson
framework by concluding that the government had a substantial
interest in protecting the public health and preventing fraud
and that FDA regulation of health claims was directly related to
that interest.8 8 The court focused on the third prong-whether
3 Pearson v Shalala, 130 F Supp 2d 105, 110 (DDC 2001) ("Pearson Il"). See also
Food and Drug Administration, Food Labeling; Health Claims and Label Statements;
Request for Scientific Data and Information, 64 Fed Reg 48841-02 (1999).
84 See Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance for Industry on Disclosing
Information Provided to Advisory Committees in Connection With Open Advisory
Committee Meetings Related to the Testing or Approval of New Drugs and Convened by
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Beginning on January 1, 2000;
Availability, 64 Fed Reg 71794-02 (1999).
3 Pearson II, 130 F Supp 2d at 111 n 12 (providing additional examples of
qualifying language in the disclaimers: "It is not known whether the same level of
protection can be achieved by using only food that is naturally rich in folate. Neither is it
known whether lower intakes would be protective or whether there is a threshold below
which no protection occurs" and "It is not known whether the same level of protection
can be achieved by using lower amounts [of folate]").
' Id at 112.
87 130 F Supp 2d 105 (DDC 2001).
' Id at 113.
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the regulation was more extensive than necessary to serve the
government interest-and the DC Circuit's principle that "more
disclosure rather than less is the preferred approach, so long as
advertising is not inherently misleading."89 In reaching its
conclusion this second time, the FDA altered its basis for
prohibiting the claims to recognize the PearsonI standard-"the
weight of the scientific evidence [wa]s against . . . the proposed

claim"-but continued to reject any use of disclaimers.9 0 The
court took issue with the FDA's failure to "demonstrate with
empirical evidence that disclaimers similar to the ones suggested
by the Court of Appeals would bewilder consumers and fail to
correct for deceptiveness."9 1
The district court interpreted Pearson I to require an
inquiry into "whether there is any credible evidence" in support
of the claim, and if so, that it "may not be absolutely
prohibited." 92 The court acknowledged that it is "not [the role of]
the judicial branch to undertake comparative evaluations of
conflicting scientific evidence," 93 but then proceeded to review
the FDA's evaluation of the evidence. 94 While the court agreed
that the claims were potentially misleading, it disagreed that
the weight of the evidence was against the claims and, thus,
held that they could not be completely suppressed.9 5 Narrowing
the Pearson I standard, it concluded that "[t]he mere absence of
significant affirmative evidence in support of a particular

Id at 113.
Id at 114-15.
9' PearsonII, 130 F Supp 2d at 118, quoting PearsonI, 164 F3d at 659-60 (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
92 Pearson II, 130 F Supp 2d at 114, 118, quoting
Pearson I, 164 F3d at 658
(quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
9
Pearson II, 130 F Supp 2d at 115, quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v
Environmental ProtectionAgency, 824 F2d 1211, 1216 (DC Cir 1987).
94 PearsonII, 130 F Supp 2d at 114. The PearsonII court stated that:
8

90

[T]he FDA divided Plaintiffs' proposed claim . . . into essentially two subclaims .... Then, the FDA analyzed each sub-claim separately.... Taking
these two sub-claims together, the FDA concluded that, "based on the totality
of the scientific evidence, there is not significant scientific agreement among
qualified experts". . . The FDA further concluded, without elaboration, that
"the weight of the evidence is against both aspects of the proposed claim," and
that the claim is "inherently misleading and cannot be made non-misleading
with a disclaimer or other qualifying language."
Id.
9

Id at 115.
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. does not translate into negative evidence 'against' it"

and that "the FDA may not ban ... [a c]laim simply because the
scientific literature is inconclusive."9 6
As a result of its review of the scientific data, the court held
that, as a matter of law, the claims were not inherently
misleading and that the FDA's decision to ban the claims
without considering disclaimers was arbitrary and capricious in
violation of the APA. 97 Reiterating the value of disclaimers in
correcting any potential misleadingness, the court granted the
plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and ordered the
FDA to draft disclaimers to rectify the claims.98 While noting
that "it is the FDA's, rather than the Court's, institutional role
to draft accurate, adequate, and succinct health claim
disclaimers," the court suggested that the FDA reconsider the
DC Circuit's proposed disclaimers. 99
2.

PearsonIII.

The FDA moved for reconsideration of Pearson II, arguing
that the District Court of the District of Columbia committed
clear error by "assign[ing] undue weight to a particular clinical
study and failing to consider the relevant scientific evidence in
totality" and by creating a standard inconsistent with the
holding in Pearson T10 The court denied the motion on both
accounts, agreed with Pearson II that the FDA failed to comply
with Pearson I, and continued to hold the FDA to Pearson Il's
standard for declaring a claim inherently misleading-the
requirement of empirical evidence to reject disclaimers.10 1 It

"

Id at 115, 118.

9

Id at 114-15.
Pearson II, 130 F Supp 2d at 120. The court required the FDA to draft
disclaimers to modify the plaintiffs' proposed claims, rather than considering the
alternative claims the FDA proposed. See id.
9 Id at 120, stating that:
98

The Court strongly suggests the agency consider the two disclaimers suggested
by the Pearson Court ("The evidence in support of this claim is inconclusive"
and "The FDA does not approve this claim"), as well as the disclaimer put forth
by Plaintiffs ("Foods fortified with similar amounts of folic acid may be as
effective as dietary supplements in reducing the risk of neural tube defects").
Id.
'n
Pearson v Thompson, 141 F Supp 2d 105, 108 (DDC 2001) ("Pearson H')
(quotation marks omitted).
101 Id.
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denied that Pearson II "implied that the FDA must authorize a
[health] claim whenever any credible evidence supports the
claim."102 Rather, the court offered a clarification of PearsonII in
conjunction with PearsonI, reiterating:
[T]he FDA [may] impos[e] an outright ban on a claim
where evidence in support of the claim is qualitatively
weaker than evidence against the claim-for example,
where the claim rests on only one or two old studies or
where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by
evidence against the claim. 103
The court then stated that PearsonII clarified the meaning of
"against" when it held that "[t]he mere absence of significant
affirmative evidence in support of a particular claim . . . does not

translate into negative evidence 'against'
3.

it."104

Whitaker.

The District Court of the District of Columbia refused to
defer to the FDA's conclusions regarding the scientific evidence
in Whitaker v Thompson.10 5 The Pearson I plaintiffs filed
another suit regarding the antioxidant claim on their dietary
supplements: "Consumption of antioxidant vitamins may reduce
the risk of certain kinds of cancers." 106 The plaintiffs filed suit
after the FDA found a lack of significant scientific agreement
and found the claim inherently misleading because "the weight
of the scientific evidence against the relationship was greater
than the weight of evidence in favor of the relationship."1 0 7
The court granted plaintiffs' preliminary injunction,
concluding that the FDA failed to demonstrate that complete
suppression was "the least restrictive means of protecting
consumers against the potential of being mislead [sic] by the
[c]laim."1 08 The district court took the Pearson I holding a step
further from merely requiring a "reasonable fit" to now requiring

102

"0
10
105

Id at 110 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).
Id at 112, citing Pearson I, 164 F3d at 659 n 10, 660 (quotation marks omitted).
Pearson III, 141 F Supp 2d at 112, citing Pearson II, 130 F Supp 2d at 115.
248 F Supp 2d 1 (DDC 2002).

10

Id at 2.
Id at 7.

108

Id at 8 (emphasis added).
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the "least restrictive" means.1 0 9 The court stated that PearsonI
stood for two conclusions: (1) it did not eliminate the possibility
that a disclaimer could correct an inherently misleading claim;
and (2) total suppression of a claim was restricted to two
scenarios-when no evidence supported a claim or when
evidence supporting the claim was "qualitatively weaker than
evidence against the claim."1 10 It further required in both
scenarios that the FDA demonstrate with empirical evidence
that
a
disclaimer
would
not
correct
the
claim's
misleadingness.111

Like in Pearson II, the court thoroughly reviewed the FDA's
analysis of the scientific evidence, citing the FDA's failure to
authorize disclaimers in light of PearsonI as authorization. 11 2 It
elaborated that deference to the agency's expertise "does not
negate the duty of [the] court to ensure that an agency ...
conduct a process of reasoned decisionmaking."1 1 3 Of the 150
studies the FDA considered, the court concluded that one-third
supported the health claim. 114 The FDA discounted the
evidentiary value of many of those studies, however, for "study
errors or design limitations."1 15 Nonetheless, the court concluded
that the FDA was unreasonable in its analysis of the scientific
data.11 6 Because it construed Pearson I as permitting complete
bans only when there was qualitatively weak evidence in one or
two old studies and because the FDA failed to provide empirical
109 See PearsonI, 164 F3d at 656. See note 108.
110 Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 10-11.
ni

Id.

u1 See id at 10-14. The court wrote that:
Given the FDA's continual refusal to authorize the disclaimers suggested by
the Court of Appeals, or any other disclaimers, as well as the FDA's resistance
to the teachings of Pearson I, it is essential to carefully review the analysis it
relied upon to ban Plaintiffs' Antioxidant Vitamin Claim in the context of the
PearsonI opinion.
Id.
113 Id at 11, quoting K N Energy, Inc v
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 968
F2d 1295, 1303 (DC Cir 1992) (quotation marks omitted).
114 Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 11.
115 Id at 11
n 12.
116 Id at 13. The court also noted that, under
the Guidelines, certain types of studies

should get more weight than others and stated that the FDA did not follow its own
guidelines in this respect. See id at 12 ('Th[e] Report states that intervention studies
should be weighed more heavily than observational studies. Thus, the FDA simply failed
to follow its own Report and give appropriate weight to the approximately one-third of
the intervention studies that supported the Plaintiffs' Claim.").
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evidence of the disclaimer's ineffectiveness, the court held that
suppression of the claim was unconstitutional.1 17 It remanded
the case to the FDA to draft "accurate, adequate, and succinct"
disclaimers and suggested that the FDA consider the proposed
disclaimers from Pearson I-"The evidence in support of this
claim is inconclusive" and "The FDA does not approve this
claim."1 18
Following Whitaker, the FDA separated the evaluation of
health claims into qualified and unqualified claims.119 For
claims supported by SSA, the FDA considered the claim
"unqualified" and approved it without a disclaimer. 120 If the FDA
determined that the proposed claim lacked support of SSA but
that the "weight of the evidence" supported the claim, the FDA
considered the claim "qualified" and proposed a disclaimer to
reflect the appropriate value of scientific support.121 In drafting
a disclaimer, the FDA focused on clarifying the degree of
scientific certainty for consumers. 122 Additionally, the FDA used
a "reasonable consumer standard" in evaluating the language of
health claims, meaning the information must be appropriate for
a consumer taking an active role in his or her health choices,
rather than the "ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous"
consumer.123

"

See id at 13-14 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that:
The FDA has banned the Plaintiffs' claim by concluding that the evidence in
support of it was weaker than evidence against it, but it is clear that more than
60 recent studies reviewed by the FDA supported the claim. This hardly
constitutes the "one or two old studies" that the Court of Appeals contemplated
might support a total ban.

Id.
us Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 17.
u1s Fleminger,Inc v United States Department of Health and Human Services, 854 F
Supp 2d 192, 200 (D Conn 2012). See also 67 Fed Reg at 78003-04 (cited in note 39).
120
Fleminger,854 F Supp 2d at 200.
121
See id; 67 Fed Reg at 78003 (cited in note 39) ("The test is not whether the claim
is supported numerically (i.e., whether more studies support the proposed claim than
not), but rather whether the pertinent data and information presented in those studies is
sufficiently scientifically persuasive.").
122
See 67 Fed Reg at 78003 (cited in note 39).
123
Id at 78004.
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Alliance L

The District Court first verbalized its use of an
"independent" review in Alliance for Natural Health US v
Sebelius ("Alliance l').124 The FDA rejected seven of ten of a
dietary supplement manufacturer's proposed health claims as
inherently misleading-such as "Selenium may reduce the risk
of certain cancers. Scientific evidence supporting this claim is
convincing but not yet conclusive." 12 5 The FDA exercised
enforcement discretion as to the remaining three, drafting
lengthy and detailed claims:
1) One study suggests that selenium intake may reduce
the risk of bladder cancer in women. However, one
smaller study showed no reduction in risk. Based on
these studies, FDA concludes that it [sic] highly
uncertain that selenium supplements reduce the risk of
bladder cancer in women;
2) Two weak studies suggest that selenium intake may
reduce the risk of prostate cancer. However, four stronger
studies and three weak studies showed no reduction in
risk. Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it is
highly unlikely that selenium supplements reduce the
risk of prostate cancer; and
3) One weak, small study suggests that selenium intake
may reduce the risk of thyroid cancer. Based on this
study, FDA concludes that it is highly uncertain that
selenium supplements reduce the risk of thyroid
cancer. 126

714 F Supp 2d 48 (DDC 2010).
See id at 57-58 & n 16. The remaining claims referred to specific types of cancers
and were all qualified with the language "convincing but not yet conclusive." Id at 57 n
16.
126 See id at 57-58 & n 19. The original
language of the claims read:
124
125

1) Selenium may reduce the risk of bladder and urinary tract cancers.
Scientific evidence supporting this claim is convincing but not yet conclusive.
2) Selenium may reduce the risk of prostate cancer. Scientific evidence
supporting this claim is convincing but not yet conclusive.
3) Selenium may reduce the risk of thyroid cancer. Scientific evidence
supporting this claim is convincing but not yet conclusive.
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Plaintiffs claimed the seven claims were rejected in
violation of Pearson I and that the modification of the remaining
three claims was "unreasonably long and burdensome," in
violation of the First Amendment.127
The parties disagreed as to the standard of review the court
should apply in reviewing the FDA's conclusions under the
APA.128 The plaintiffs urged the court to adopt a heightened
review because they raised a constitutional issue, while the FDA
contended that "particularized findings concerning the scientific
evidence" merited an arbitrary and capricious review. 129 The
court concluded that it would conduct an "independent review"
of agency decisions on constitutional issues,130 but noted that it
would be inappropriate to review the scientific evidence without
some deference.13 Nevertheless, the court determined that an
"independent review," more thorough than an arbitrary and
capricious review, was appropriate.132 The court stated that this
was consistent with PearsonI:
By instructing the FDA to employ less restrictive means
of regulating speech and to provide greater empirical
support for its regulatory decisions, the DC Circuit did
not purport to tell the Agency how to assess scientific
data. Rather, it provided the Agency with guidelines for
developing regulations once it had evaluated the evidence
before it. 133
The Alliance I court noted that Whitaker went further than
Pearson I in requiring practically no qualitative evidence
supporting the claim and requiring empirical evidence of public

See id at 57 n 16.
Id at 58.
See Alliance I, 714 F Supp at 59.
129
Id.
130 Id at 59-60, citing JJ Cassone Bakery, Inc v NLRB, 554 F3d 1041, 1044
(DC Cir
2009) ("The Court concludes that it is obligated to conduct an independent review of the
record and must do so without reliance on the Agency's determinations as to
constitutional questions.").
131
Id at 60, quoting Ethyl Corp v Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F2d 1, 36
(DC Cir 1976) ("[T]he enforced education into the intricacies of the problem before the
agency is not designed to enable the court to become a superagency that can supplant
the agency's expert decision-maker.").
132 Alliance I, 714 F Supp 2d at 59-60, citing JJ CassoneBakery, 554 F3d at 1044.
13 Alliance 1, 714 F Supp 2d at
60.
127
128
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deceit for a complete ban of a claim.134 The court then employed
this heightened standard, however, to conclude that the FDA
"fail[ed] under PearsonI."135 The court reviewed each study the
FDA discounted in rejecting plaintiffs' claims, agreeing with the
FDA in almost every case. 1 36 However, the court disagreed with
the FDA's conclusion on the value of one or two studies per
claim and, thus, concluded a complete ban was unreasonable
and a disclaimer could rectify the potential misleadingness.137
The court also declined the FDA's use of enforcement
discretion to rewrite plaintiffs' prostate claim. 138 The FDA did
not refuse this claim in its entirety because it concluded the
scientific literature supported the claim. However, the FDA
rejected plaintiffs' proposed wording because "it found the
characterization of the evidence in support of the claim as
'convincing but not yet conclusive' to be false and misleading." 139
The court, in turn, rejected the FDA's reworded claim as
"inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of Pearson I,"
because it "contradict[ed] the claim and defeat[ed] the purpose of
making [it] in the first place."140 The court remanded to the FDA
to draft "short, succinct, and accurate disclaimers" instead of
completely rejecting or rewriting plaintiffs' proposed claims.14 1
5.

Alliance II.

The District Court continued to use the "independent"
review, rather than the APA's arbitrary and capricious review,

See id at 62, quoting Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at
11.
135 Alliance I, 714 F Supp 2d at 63 ("The Agency has not provided any empirical
evidence, such as 'studies' or 'anecdotal evidence,' that consumers would be misled by
either of plaintiffs' claims were they accompanied by qualifications.").
134

13s

See id at 65-70.

137 See id (disagreeing with the exclusion of one study for plaintiffs'
lung and
respiratory tract claims and with the exclusion of two studies for plaintiffs' colon and
digestive tract claims).
138 The FDA rewrote plaintiffs' original claim-"Selenium may reduce the risk of
prostate cancer. Scientific evidence supporting this claim is convincing but not yet
conclusive."-as "Two weak studies suggest that selenium intake may reduce the risk of
prostate cancer. However, four stronger studies and three weak studies showed no
reduction in risk. Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it is highly unlikely that
selenium supplements reduce the risk of prostate cancer." Id at 57 n 16, 58 n 19.
139 Alliance 1, 714 F Supp 2d at 71.
140

Id at 71-72.

141

Id at 72.
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in Alliance for Natural Health US v Sebelius ("Alliance If').142
The same dietary supplement manufacturers from Alliance I
filed suit for a similar set of facts, with the FDA entirely denying
thirteen proposed claims and modifying the language of four
others. 143 Plaintiffs objected that the ruling on six of the
claims-four of the rejected claims and two modified claimsviolated the First Amendment. 144 The rejected claims used
language similar to those rejected in Alliance I-"Vitamin C
may reduce the risk of lung cancer. The scientific evidence
supporting this claim is convincing, but not conclusive." 145 The
modified claims had similar language-"Vitamin C may reduce
the risk of gastric cancer. The scientific evidence supporting this
claim is persuasive, but not conclusive."-and the FDA rewrote
them as, "One weak study and one study with inconsistent
results suggest that vitamin C supplements may reduce the risk
of gastric cancer. Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it
is highly uncertain that vitamin C supplements reduce the risk
of gastric cancer." 146
The court cited Alliance l's use of an "independent
assessment" when reviewing the FDA's conclusions impacting a
constitutional issue, while simultaneously stating it must defer
to the agency's technical expertise. 147 After reviewing the FDA's
application of its Guidelines to the studies, the court determined
the complete ban of the four claims was not arbitrary and
capricious. 14 8 Conversely, it rejected the rewording of the two
modified claims. 149 Following the reasoning in Alliance I, the
court determined the modifications completely replaced the
plaintiffs' claims and effectively negated the relationship
between the dietary supplement and the health benefit. 15 0 The

786 F Supp 2d 1 (DDC 2011).
Id at 10.
1
Id at 10-11.
145 Id at
11.
146 Alliance II, 786 F Supp 2d
at 11.
147 Id at 12 ("While the Court is obligated to conduct an independent
review of the
record and must do so without reliance on the [FDA's] determinations as to
constitutional questions, it must also give deference to an agency's assessment of
scientific or technical data within its area of expertise.") (quotation marks omitted).
148 See id at 18-23 (finding that the FDA provided reasoned explanations for why it
excluded certain studies).
149
See id at 23-24.
15o Alliance II, 786 F Supp 2d at
24.
142
143
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court concluded that "[w]here the evidence supporting a claim is
inconclusive, the First Amendment permits the claim to be
made; the FDA cannot require a disclaimer that simply
swallows the claim." 51 It remanded to the FDA to draft precise
disclaimers focusing on the "strength or nature of the
evidentiary support for that substance-disease relationship." 152
The court also reviewed the FDA's 2009 Guidance
Document53 in light of plaintiffs' argument that the Guidelines
instituted the Pearson I standard in theory but that "the FDA
ha[d] simply shifted the focus to the question of what
constitute[d] 'credible' evidence and ha[d] adopted an overly
restrictive standard of credibility." 15 4 The court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument, finding the FDA's application of the
Guidance Document in assessing the credibility of the scientific
evidence to be reasonable.15 5 The court reviewed the FDA's
evaluation of each of the plaintiffs' scientific studies and, in each
instance, found the FDA's conclusion in excluding the study, or
rejecting its credibility, reasonable and not arbitrary and
capricious.1 56
In dicta, the court noted that it did not interpret Pearson I
as requiring the FDA to present empirical evidence on a
disclaimer's efficacy before banning a claim, but rather,
"unsupported or very weakly supported claims may simply be
banned outright" because they would be unprotected commercial
speech under the first step of Central Hudson.1 5 7 However, the
court reiterated that for claims that are only potentially
misleading, the FDA would have to present empirical evidence
showing the inefficacy of a disclaimer if it attempted to ban the
claim outright.1 5 8

15' Id at 24.

Id at 24 n 22.
See text accompanying note 36.
154 Alliance II, 786 F Supp 2d at 17. See Food and Drug Administration, Guidelines
at § II (cited in note 36).
1
See Alliance II, 786 F Supp 2d at 16-17 (breaking down the guideline framework
for assessing the evidence supporting proposed health claims).
'
Alliance II, 786 F Supp 2d at 18-23 (agreeing with the rejection of the proposed
Vitamin C lung cancer claim, the Vitamin C colon cancer claim, the Vitamin E lung
cancer claim, and the Vitamin E gastric cancer claim).
157 Id at 14, citing Pearson 1, 164 F3d at 659 n 10.
158 Alliance II, 786 F Supp 2d at
15.
152

153
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6.

Fleminger.

Unlike the previous interpretations of Pearson I, the
District Court for the District of Connecticut struck the balance
of respecting the FDA's evaluation of the scientific evidence and
directing the FDA to issue disclaimer language that reflected
the strength of the evidence. In Fleminger, Inc v United States

Department of Health and Human Services,15 9 the District Court
for the District of Connecticut encountered a challenge to the
regulation of qualified health claims.o60 Because the Second
Circuit had not addressed the issue, the court looked to the DC
Circuit precedent for guidance.' 6 ' Fleminger proposed a health
claim for its green tea products linking consumption of green tea
with a reduced risk of cancer: "Daily consumption of 40 ounces of
typical green tea containing 710 g/ml of natural (-) epigallocatechin gallate (EGCG) may reduce the risk of certain
forms of cancer. There is scientific evidence supporting this
health claim although the evidence is not conclusive."162 The
FDA concluded that it would exercise enforcement discretion on
claims for breast and prostate cancer only because there was a
lack of credible evidence supporting the claims for other types of
cancer.163 Fleminger resubmitted its claim: "Green tea may
reduce the risk of cancer of the breast and the prostate. The
FDA has concluded that there is credible evidence supporting
this claim although the evidence is limited."164 After some back
and forth, the FDA proposed its own modified claim: "Green tea
may reduce the risk of breast or prostate cancer. FDA does not
agree that green tea may reduce the risk because there is very
little scientific evidence for the claim."16 5 Fleminger sued for

159
160

854 F Supp 2d 192 (D Conn 2012).
Id.

161
Although the DC Circuit precedent involves health claims on dietary
supplements and the health claims at issue in Fleminger are on food products, the court
concluded that the analysis is the same. See id at 195.
162 Id at 203.
163 Fleminger,854 F Supp 2d at
203.

164 Id at 204-05.
Id at 206. The FDA initially proposed claims similar to those rejected in Alliance
I. Fleminger sought reconsideration, which was denied. Fleminger informally responded,
received no response, and began using its resubmitted claim. The FDA reconsidered its
rejection and proposed claims in light of the ruling in Alliance I, and then proposed the
modified claim instead.
'65
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violation of its First Amendment commercial free speech
rights.166
The FDA voiced concern that consumers would likely
assume the FDA endorsed the strength of Fleminger's proposed
claim, particularly because the claim invoked the FDA by name,
citing empirical evidence that "35% to 57% of consumers, with or
without use experience with dietary supplements, mistakenly
believe that the government regulates the manufacturing and
pre-approves the marketing of these products."167 The court
embraced this concern, highlighting the extensive history
linking the FDA to food regulation and the substantial interest
the FDA has in "preventing consumers from assuming the FDA
has approved the qualified health claim."168 The court held that
without the FDA's approval, "a proposed health claim cannot
include specific reference to the 'FDA' in its marketing."169
The court articulated that it was not its role to assess
scientific data and that it would defer to both the FDA's
assessment of the scientific evidence170 and to "the FDA's
determination that Fleminger's articulation of the level of
scientific evidence was inaccurate and misleading."' 7 1 Fleminger
did not challenge the FDA's conclusion about the minimal
strength of the evidence; it argued that the FDA did not need to
replace Fleminger's claim with its own because Fleminger's
claim "accurately convey[ed] the strength of scientific
evidence."172 After reviewing the FDA's rationale in concluding
the claim was misleading, the court agreed with the FDA that

166
167

Id at 206.
Fleminger, 854 F Supp 2d at 205.

16s

Id at 209-11.

Id at 211.
Id at 207, citing Marsh v Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 US 360, 377
(1989). The court explained that:
161

170

The Court is not in the position, nor is it the Court's role, to independently
assess the highly technical scientific data to determine what amount of
scientific evidence supports the proposed health claim at issue. Such a
determination falls squarely within the ambit of the FDA's expertise and
therefore the Court must give deference to the FDA's assessment of the
strength of the scientific data at issue.
Id.
171 Fleminger, 854 F Supp 2d at 211, citing Federal Power Commission v Florida
Power & Light Co, 404 US 453, 463 (1972).
172 Fleminger, 854 F Supp
2d at 211.
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"credible but limited" was an inaccurate description of the
evidence. 173
The court accepted the FDA's modified claim in part and
rejected it in part. According to the court, the portion stating
there is "very little scientific evidence" attained a reasonable
balance between permitting the claim to be made, accurately
reflecting the strength of the evidence, and not burdening more
speech than necessary. 174 Conversely, the court rejected the
portion stating "FDA does not agree that green tea may reduce
that risk."1 5 Like the rejected modifications in Alliance II, the
court found that this statement effectively negated the
relationship between green tea and a reduction in the risk of
cancer and found it to be unnecessary in addition to the
disclaimer "very little scientific evidence." 176 The court
recommended that the FDA follow Pearson Is suggestion,
stating, "the FDA does not approve this claim," without the
effect of negating the claim.177
III. INCONSISTENCIES INTERPRETING PEARSON I
This Part explores the number of problems that emerge
from the district courts' varying applications and expansions of
Pearson L First, Pearson I cited the APA's arbitrary and
capricious standard in requiring the FDA to clarify "significant
scientific agreement."1 8 However, while the district courts
mention the deferential standard of review, they frequently
apply a more searching review to overturn the FDA's judgment.
Second, the district courts go beyond the Pearson I holding that
disclosure is preferable to suppression to almost eliminating the
FDA's ability to ban a misleading claim. The additional
restrictions the district courts impose on the FDA's ability to
regulate health claims and to draft disclaimers it considers
17
Id at 211-12. The court drew a distinction between "credible evidence" in a
regulatory framework versus a consumer context. In a regulatory framework, the term
indicates there is minimal evidence supporting the claim. To consumers, "credible
evidence" indicates a basis for believing the claim to be true. The court likens the use of
the term in a consumer context to the SSA standard, which the FDA uses as a reflection
of scientific consensus that the claim is true. See id at 213-14.
114 Id at 216-17.
17

Id at 217-18.

176

Fleminger,854 F Supp 2d at 217-18.

17

Id at 218.

178

See Pearson1, 164 F3d at 660-61.
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accurate and informative negate the agency's mandated goal of
protecting consumers and the public health. 179 Furthermore, the
inconsistencies between the holdings fail to provide clear
guidance for the FDA to proceed in the regulation of future
health claims.
A.

Complete Ban of a Claim

The first principle the DC Circuit espoused in Pearson I is
that disclaimers are preferable to outright suppression.1 80
However, the court expressly left open the possibility of a
complete ban of a claim "where evidence in support of a claim is
outweighed by evidence against the claim" or "where evidence in
support of the claim is . qualitatively weaker than evidence
against the claim." 8 1 The court recognized that, in instances
when the balance of evidence was against the claim, no
disclaimer would rectify the potential misleadingness of the
claim. 182 The court provided an illustrative example:
[I]f the weight of the evidence were against the
hypothetical claim that "Consumption of Vitamin E
reduces the risk of Alzheimer's disease," the agency
might reasonably determine that adding a disclaimer
such as "The FDA has determined that no evidence
supports this claim" would not suffice to mitigate the
claim's misleadingness. 183
Pearson I expressly left an opening for the FDA to exercise
its judgment in evaluating the evidence and completely ban
claims unsupported by science. The court did not require that
the claim have absolutely no support to be banned but merely be
"outweighed" or supported by evidence of a lesser quality.
Furthermore, the court noted that judicial review of the FDA's

"9 See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, HR 3562, 101st Cong, 2d Sess, in 136
Cong Rec 33426 (Oct 24, 1990). See also Food and Drug Administration, The Mission of
the FDA *1, online at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/
UCM195857.pdf (visited Sept 15, 2013).
'o
See Pearson I, 164 F3d at 657.
'
'8
183

Id at 659 & n 10.

See id at 659.
Id.
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conclusions of the weight of the evidence fell under the APA's
arbitrary and capricious standard. 184
In interpreting Pearson I, the district courts' confusion
arises over how to measure the "weight" of the evidence. Pearson
II construed the standard more strictly; although the court
conceded that "there [wa]s not a scientific consensus which
affirmatively support[ed] [p]laintiffs' assertion," it determined
that the "mere absence of significant affirmative evidence in
support of a particular claim . .. does not translate into negative

evidence 'against' it."185 This conclusion is problematic because it
implies that the FDA may not ban claims that it determines are
scientifically unsupported. This would leave the agency
statutorily authorized to regulate health claims and prevent
consumer fraud18 6 no authority to prevent unsupported claims.
The court does not clarify how it classifies evidence that is not
affirmatively supporting the claim but that is not against the
claim. The balancing of this hazy category of not-affirmativebut-not-negative evidence should fall upon the FDA, only to be
reviewed by the court for arbitrariness.187 By holding that a lack
of affirmative evidence cannot shift the balance of the weight of
the evidence against the claim, the court limited the range of
claims the FDA can ban as scientifically unsupported.
The Whitaker court focused on the qualitative nature of the
evidence to completely ban a claim. 8 8 Pearson I gave an
example of qualitatively weak evidence-"where the claim rests
on only one or two old studies"-that would shift the weight of
evidence against the claim.189 Whitaker focused on the quantity
and age of the evidence, "one or two old studies," rather than the
principle that the FDA Guidelines determine the quality of the
evidence, based on factors like the type of study or the
population considered.o9 0 If the FDA determines that the study
is scientifically weak, Pearson I implied that the agency may
disregard the study or reduce its value in determining the

See PearsonI, 164 F3d at 660.
PearsonII, 130 F Supp 2d at 115.
186 See Part I.A.
187 See Part TV.A.
'8
's

1s

Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 13.
PearsonI, 164 F3d at 659 n 10.
19 See Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 12-13. See Food and Drug Administration,
Guidelines at § III (cited in note 36).
189
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weight of the evidence.' 9e In Whitaker, approximately sixty
recent studies-only one-third of the submitted studiessupported the claim. 192 The FDA further "discounted many of
the studies supporting the relationship for study errors or
design limitations," which the court found arbitrary and in
violation of the FDA's Guidance Report. 193 Regardless, Whitaker
held that when only one-third of evidence supports the claim,
this does not fall under Pearson l's "weight of the evidence"
against the claim standard to allow a complete ban. 194 Thus,
Whitaker mischaracterizes Pearson I, focusing on the specifics of
the example rather than the principle.
Overall, the district courts have limited the exceptions
Pearson I provided for a complete ban of a claim. Even when
there was little affirmative support for the claim or the evidence
supporting the claim was of a lesser quality, the district courts
prohibited a complete ban. This greatly restricts the FDA's
ability to fulfill its mandate. The FDA declares its mission as
follows: "The FDA is responsible for advancing the public health
by helping to speed the innovations that make medicines and
foods more effective, safer, and more affordable; and helping the
public get accurate, science-based information they need to use
medicines and foods to improve their health."1 95 Furthermore,
Congress enacted the NLEA with the specific goals of consumer
protection and public health in mind. 196 By replacing their
judgment of the scientific evidence over that of the FDA, the
courts interfere with the statutory scheme and inhibit the FDA
from fulfilling its mission of providing accurate information to
consumers.

191
192
193

14
195

See Pearson 1, 164 F3d at 659 n 10.
Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 13.
See id at 11 n 12, 12-13.
Compare Pearson 1, 164 F3d at 659, with Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 13.
Food and Drug Administration,

The Mission of the FDA *1, online at

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDERIUCM195857.pdf (visited
Sept 15, 2013) (emphasis added).
196 See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, HR 3562, 101st Cong, 2d
Sess, in 136
Cong Rec 33426 (Oct 24, 1990).
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B.

Language of Disclaimers

The DC Circuit acknowledged that it was the FDA's task to
draft disclaimers and not the court's. 197 However, the court
offered examples of general disclaimers that would rectify
potential misleadingness without infringing on manufacturers'
speech, such as, "The FDA does not approve this claim," or "The
evidence in support of this claim is inconclusive."198 Additionally,
the court offered an example of a specific disclaimer detailing
the strength of the scientific evidence and the rationale for that
determination: "The evidence is inconclusive because existing
studies have been performed with foods containing antioxidant
vitamins, and the effect of those foods on reducing the risk of
cancer may result from other components in those foods." 199
These examples provide the FDA with two alternate routes, one
of general disclaimers and one of specific disclaimers explaining
the rationale of the FDA's evaluation of the evidence.
Thus far, district courts have been reluctant to approve
disclaimer language the FDA has proposed, on the grounds that
the verbiage is too strongly worded and sometimes negates the
claim. Courts are especially hostile when the FDA completely
rewrites a claim, rather than permitting the manufacturer to
make the claim and follow it with the FDA's supplemental
disclaimer. In Alliance I, the FDA attempted to follow Pearson
Is instruction to provide precise disclaimers. 20 0 It seems that
"precise" is not the appropriate term to describe what courts are
looking for, however, because the court rejected the precise
disclaimer for being too imposing on speech:
Two weak studies suggest that selenium intake may
reduce the risk of prostate cancer. However, four stronger
studies and three weak studies showed no reduction in
risk. Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it is
highly unlikely that selenium supplements reduce the
risk of prostate cancer. 20 1

197

198

See Pearson I, 164 F3d at 659.
Id.

199 Id at 658 (emphasis in original) (modifying the claim "Consumption
antioxidant vitamins may reduce the risk of certain kinds of cancers").
200 See id at 659.
201
See Alliance 1, 714 F Supp 2d at 71.
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The court described this modification as an example of a
disclaimer that "contradict[s] the claim and defeats the purpose
of making [it] in the first place." 2 0 2 Rather, the example of the
specific disclaimer in Pearson I implied that the disclaimer
would follow the manufacturer's claim, not replace it, and was
specific in describing the limitations of the existing studies
without negating the claim entirely. 203
When the FDA proposed language similar to the DC Circuit
and some district courts' suggestions, courts still rejected it.204
In Fleminger,the court rejected the language "The FDA does not
agree that green tea may reduce that risk."2 0 5 However, it
encouraged language quite similar-"The FDA does not approve
this claim"-without adequately explaining the difference in its
preference. 206 The court only said that the former had the effect
of negating the claim, whereas the latter, which uses more
absolute terms, did not. 2 0 7 If the courts force the FDA to permit
health claims with which the FDA does not agree and simply
state that "the FDA does not approve this claim" without further
qualification, this leaves the FDA minimal to no authority to
prevent claims it considers misleading. Merely informing
consumers that the FDA does not agree with a claim does not
fulfill the mission of protecting the public health and preventing
consumer fraud because consumers are left in the dark as to
how much credit to give the claim. Following this methodology, a
health claim is either permitted or banned (although courts
permit very few complete bans) and if it is permitted, it is
offered at face value without qualification. Pearson I does not
preempt the FDA from qualifying the strength of the evidence,
and it is essential to do so to aid consumers in deciphering the
value of health claims.
Courts remind the FDA that its role is to draft "short,
succinct, and accurate disclaimers" reflecting the strength of the

202

Id.

203

See Pearson 1, 164 F3d at 658.
See, for example, Fleminger, 854 F Supp 2d at 217-18.

204
205

Id.

See id at 218.
See id ("Such a disclaimer [-'FDA does not approve this claim.'-] would not
have the same effect of negating Fleminger's proposed health claim in the first instance
and would therefore allow the FDA to achieve its interest in a manner that restricts less
speech.").
206

20
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scientific evidence. 208 The FDA was unsuccessful, until
Fleminger, in reflecting the strength of the evidence in a
meaningful way. Fleminger approved the portion of the
disclaimer stating there is "very little scientific evidence"
supporting the claim. 209 This, for the first time, suggested a
compromise accurately reflecting the lack of scientific support
that is short and easily understood by consumers. Thus,
Fleminger may provide a model on how the FDA should proceed
in drafting disclaimer language.
IV. SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CHALLENGES UNDER THE APA AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: DEFERRING To THE FDA FOR
INHERENTLY MISLEADING CLAIMS AND CRAFTING DISCLAIMERS
FOR POTENTIALLY MISLEADING CLAIMS
Courts face two separate and distinct challenges to FDA
regulation of health claims, one under the APA and another
under the First Amendment. However, courts have blurred the
distinction between the two challenges by inaccurately applying
a heightened standard of review to APA claims. Rather than
applying the deferential arbitrary and capricious review to the
FDA's conclusions regarding the evidence against an inherently
misleading claim, the courts often substitute their own
judgment to overturn the FDA out of concern for infringement
on commercial free speech. For potentially misleading claims,
courts continue to reject the FDA's proposed disclaimers.
Combining a suggested disclaimer from Pearson I with a
qualification of the strength of the evidence supporting the claim
results in a disclaimer that both informs consumers and respects
the First Amendment.
A.

Inherently Misleading Claims: Deferring to the FDA

In reviewing the FDA's assessment of the scientific evidence
surrounding a health claim, courts refer to the APA's arbitrary
and capricious standard of review. 2 10 Pearson I required the
See PearsonII, 130 F Supp 2d at 120.
See Fleminger, 854 F Supp 2d at 216-17.
20 Because the FDA's regulation of health claims does not involve
agency
interpretation of a statute, Chevron deference does not apply. See generally Chevron
USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984). See also
Fleminger, 854 F Supp 2d at 206 (noting that challenging the FDA's conclusions should
be analyzed "under Section 706(2) of the APA which provides that final agency action
208

209

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

624

[2013

FDA to offer clarification of the SSA standard so the court could
review the agency's conclusion under the arbitrary and
capricious standard. The court also held that there were certain
instances where complete
suppression of claims was
appropriate, such as when the FDA "deem[ed] [the claim]
incurable by a disclaimer." 2 1 1 Thus, the DC Circuit deferred to
the FDA's judgment of whether the claim was supported by the
weight of the evidence based on its technocratic expertise in
evaluating the scientific studies. However, when the district
courts that interpreted Pearson I applied the arbitrary and
capricious or "independent" review, they did a thorough
evaluation of the evidence-more than what is permitted under
the deferential standard-and often reached their own, contrary
conclusions. By applying a heightened review, the district courts
are already taking into consideration the First Amendment
preference for disclosure over suppression. Rather than applying
the deferential APA review and then separately addressing the
constitutional concerns, courts are preventing complete
suppression in the instances specifically carved out by PearsonI
by substituting their own judgment for that of the FDA.
1.

Arbitrary and capricious review.

Courts are not accurately applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. Under 5 USC § 706, the court must "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action" where those actions are
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 2 1 2 There are both substantive and
procedural components to the review. 2 13 First, the court
considers whether the agency acted within the scope of its
authority. 214 Next, the court evaluates the substantive validity
of the action, meaning "the court must consider whether the
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and

may only be set aside if arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion").
211 See Pearson 1, 164 F3d at 659-60.
212 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub L No 79-404, 60 Stat 237 (1946),
codified at 5

USC § 706(2)(A).
213 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v Volpe,
401 US 402, 416-17 (1971)
("Overton Park").
214 See id at 416, citing Schilling v Rogers, 363 US 666,
676-77 (1960).
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whether there has been a clear error of judgment."2 15 The court
may also set aside the action where there has been a procedural
violation. 216 Although there are various components to the
review, "the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one."2 17
Even where the court may disagree with the agency's conclusion,
as long as the agency followed procedure and gave a rationale
for its conclusion, "[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency." 2 18 Especially where the dispute
involves questions of fact that "require[] a high level of technical
expertise, [the court] must defer to the informed discretion of the
responsible federal agencies." 219
2.

Arbitrary and capricious review as applied to health
claims.

The DC Circuit did not focus on the appropriate level of
deference accorded to an agency like the FDA. However, Pearson
I required the FDA to define "significant scientific agreement" so
the court could evaluate the FDA's scientific conclusions under
the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard. The court reasoned
that the lack of definition of the standard the FDA applied when
evaluating the scientific evidence was the "equivalent to simply
saying no without explanation." 220 However, the court qualified
this request, noting that the FDA was not "obliged to issue a
comprehensive definition" and was "entitled to proceed case by
case." 221 Thus, the DC Circuit required, at a minimum, that the
FDA explain its evaluation of the evidence for each claim.
215
Overton Park, 401 US at 416, citing Louis Leventhal Jaffe, Judicial Control of
Administrative Action 359 (Little, Brown 1965).
216
See 5 USC § 706(2)(D). See also Overton Park, 401 US at 417.
217 Overton Park, 401 US
at 416.
218
Id. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc v Costle, 657 F2d 275, 283 (DC Cir
1981), stating:

This "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review is a highly deferential
one... which presumes the agency's action to be valid.... This standard is
viewed as a narrow one, which forbids a court from substituting its judgment
for that of the agency. ... The standard mandates judicial affirmance if a
rational basis for the agency's decision is presented . . . even though we might
otherwise disagree.
Marsh v Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 US 360, 377 (1989), quoting
Kleppe v Sierra Club, 427 US 390, 412 (1976) (quotation marks omitted).
220
Pearson1, 164 F3d at 660.
221 Id at
661.
219
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The majority of the district courts pay lip service to the
principle of giving deference to the agency's technical
expertise. 222 However, many then do a thorough review of the
scientific evidence to determine whether the court agrees with
the exclusion of certain studies or with the FDA's determination
of the study's strength and credibility. 223 The district courts that
have overturned the FDA's judgment reasoned that the FDA did
not appropriately apply its own Guidelines by excluding certain
studies or giving them less weight. 224 However, for each denial of
a claim, the FDA created a detailed record explaining which
studies supported the claim, to what extent, and the value of
that conclusion based on the strength and type of study. 225
For example, in Alliance I, the FDA excluded certain studies
from the evaluation of plaintiffs' colon and digestive track claims
because they were retrospective, meaning they measured
supplement intake after the subjects had already been
diagnosed with the related disease. 226 The court determined this
exclusion was unreasonable; while the court agreed with the
FDA on three of the four studies it reviewed, for the last one, it
noted that the measurement represented intake prior to
diagnosis because the samples were "collected mainly before the
final diagnosis or major treatment." 227 To withstand arbitrary
and capricious review, the agency is only required to have made
a reasoned decision supported adequately by evidence in the
record. Here, the FDA gave a reasoned explanation for its
exclusion of the study as retrospective because some samples
were collected post-diagnosis. Thus, when the court substituted
its own judgment for that of the agency technically qualified and
statutorily authorized to review the scientific evidence, it
exceeded the deferential standard of review. The court's
heightened review resulted in the conclusion that a complete
ban of the claim was unwarranted and a remand to consider
disclaimers, if necessary.228
See, for example, Alliance for Natural Health US v Sebelius, 714 F Supp 2d 48,
60 (DDC 2010) ("Alliance F).
223 See, for example, id at 63-70.
222

See id at 68-71; Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 11-13.
See, for example, Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 11 n 12 ("[T]he FDA discounted
many of the studies supporting the relationship for study errors or design limitations.").
226 See Alliance 1, 714 F Supp 2d at 69.
227 Id (emphasis
added).
228 Id at 70.
2
225
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This is not to say that the FDA never misapplies its
Guidelines or that the courts never apply the correct standard of
review. For example, in Whitaker, the FDA emphasized studies
that focused on high-risk populations to determine that the
evidence did not support the claim, whereas the Guidelines
discourage extrapolating such studies to the general
population.2 29 The court correctly determined that this
misapplication of the Guidelines was unreasonable under an
arbitrary and capricious review. 230 Alternatively, Alliance II
found the FDA's decision to completely suppress four claims
reasonable and not arbitrary because the FDA explained its
rationale: "Since the FDA has provided a reasoned explanation
for the exclusion of these studies and the explanation is
consistent with the FDA's Guidance Document, the FDA's
decision that these studies do not constitute credible evidence of
the claim must be upheld." 231 While a misapplication of the
Guidelines is appropriate grounds for remand, the court's mere
disagreement with the FDA's conclusions is not.
3.

Rationale for the application of a heightened standard
of review.

Although the courts refer to the appropriate legal standard
when reviewing an APA claim, they actually apply a stricter
standard that results in fewer complete bans on health claims.
Courts may apply a stricter standard of review, either
unconsciously or knowingly but subversively, because of
concerns of the resulting First Amendment conflict if they defer
to the FDA. In the health claims cases, the courts reviewed the
FDA's conclusions under a heightened standard, often reached
an opposing conclusion that the speech was not inherently
misleading, and thus preempted the more significant

229

See Whitaker, 248 F Supp 2d at 12-13. The court reasoned that:

The [Guidance] Report clearly states that "[a]lthough interventional studies
are the most reliable category of studies for determining cause-and-effect
relationships, generalizing from selected populations often presents serious
problems in the interpretation of such studies." . . . Yet, that is precisely what
the FDA did when it generalized from studies of high-risk populations to
evaluate the Plaintiffs' health claim.
Id.
230

231

See id at 13.
Alliance II, 786 F Supp 2d at 19.
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infringement on manufacturers' commercial free speech that
would have resulted from a complete ban.
The Alliance I and Alliance II courts acknowledged their
application of a heightened standard, the "independent review":
"While the Court is obligated to conduct an independent review
of the record and must do so without reliance on the [FDA's]
determinations as to constitutional questions, it must also give
deference to an agency's assessment of scientific or technical
data within its area of expertise." 232 Neither the Alliance I nor
the Alliance II courts elaborated on how they could both
independently review the constitutional question of whether to
suppress speech while simultaneously deferring to the FDA's
determination that the evidence did not support the claims,
which would result in suppressed speech under Pearson I.
Fleminger, on the other hand, stated that the level of support for
a claim was "squarely within the ambit of the FDA's expertise,"
and as such, the court would give deference not only to the
FDA's assessment of the weight of the evidence but also to "the
FDA's determination that Fleminger's articulation of the level of
scientific evidence was inaccurate and misleading." 233 This court
accurately applied Pearson I by deferring to the FDA's
conclusions of the weight of the evidence and the resulting
impact on commercial speech. 234
The antecedent question is who gets to determine if the
speech is misleading, the FDA or the court? Pearson I implies
that the FDA has the authority, via its conclusions regarding
the weight of the evidence supporting the claim, to determine
whether the claim is inherently misleading:
[W]here evidence in support of a claim is outweighed by
evidence against the claim, the FDA could deem it
incurable by a disclaimer and ban it outright.... [W]e
see no problem with the FDA imposing an outright ban

Alliance II, 786 F Supp 2d at 12, citing Alliance 1, 714 F Supp 2d at 60 (quotation
marks omitted).
233 Fleminger, 854 F Supp 2d
at 211.
the claim in Fleminger was only potentially
determined
Because the FDA
2
misleading, not inherently misleading and subject to complete suppression, perhaps the
court was not tempted to apply a higher standard of review.
232
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on a claim where evidence in support of the claim is
qualitatively weaker than evidence against the claim. 235
These statements suggest that the FDA has the authority to
determine when a claim may be banned outright. However, this
conflicts with the first prong of the Central Hudson analysis,
which requires the court to determine "whether the commercial
speech .. . is misleading." 236 Legal scholarship is beginning to
explore whether courts applying the Central Hudson test to
constitutional claims are actually invoking a stricter standard
than the intermediate scrutiny the test originally articulated. 237
Permitting a court to answer this antecedent question, however,
often forces the answer to the first prong of Central Hudsonthat the claim is not inherently misleading and cannot be
completely suppressed.
While courts seek to avoid a constitutional question where
possible, 238 they should not do so by misapplying the legal
standard. In other constitutional challenges, courts have
claimed to apply a deferential standard of review to overturn a
decision, only later acknowledging they actually applied a
heightened review. 239 Perhaps the Supreme Court will
acknowledge
that this interaction
of regulatory and
constitutional issues also requires a heightened review of
administrative agency action. However, until that time, a
district court must apply the law in reviewing a challenged
health claim, even if that means deferring to an FDA conclusion
with which it disagrees. Such is the result of an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review for conclusions resulting from an
agency's area of expertise.
Pearson1, 164 F3d at 659 (emphasis added).
Thompson v Western States Medical Center, 535 US 357, 367 (2002).
237
See generally Samantha Rauer, When the First Amendment and Public Health
Collide: The Court's Increasingly Strict Constitutional Scrutiny of Health Regulations
that Restrict Commercial Speech, 38 Am J L & Med 690 (2012); David Orentlicher, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine in Health Regulation: The Clash Between the PublicInterest
in a Robust First Amendment and the Public Interest in Effective Protectionfrom Harm,
37 Am J L & Med 299 (2011).
2See Charles H. Koch Jr, 4 Administrative Law And Practice § 11:11[3] (West 3d
2013) ("A well-established judicial practice has been to interpret statutes so as to avoid,
if possible, constitutional questions.").
239
Compare Craigv Boren, 429 US 190 (1976), with Reed v Reed, 404 US 71 (1971).
In a gender discrimination context, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, while
initially overturning gender discrimination under the guise of rational basis review, it
was actually applying heightened scrutiny the entire time.
235

236
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Potentially Misleading Claims: Acceptable Disclaimers
under the First Amendment

Even if courts appropriately apply the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, this only eliminates the First
Amendment problem for inherently misleading claims. For
potentially misleading claims, courts often agree with the FDA's
evaluation of the scientific evidence but still find the language of
the disclaimer too burdensome on speech. 240 Combining the
example disclaimer proposed in Pearson I with district courts'
emphasis on conciseness and the strength of the evidence results
in an example disclaimer that balances the FDA's goals with the
First Amendment.
For potentially misleading claims, the FDA is often more
concerned with the language of the claim than with the claim,
itself: "[I]t appears that the Agency's central objection to the
claim concerns the nature of the qualifying language, not the
underlying relationship claim."24 1 The various interpretations of
the district courts share two principles for the successful
wording of a disclaimer. First, courts are more likely to approve
a disclaimer that alters some wording of the claim rather than
completely rewriting it. Courts rejected FDA attempts to rewrite
claims in their entirety as too burdensome and more likely to
negate the claim. 24 2 On the other hand, the FDA had success in
Fleminger with a disclaimer merely altering the qualifying
language. 243 Second, the proposed disclaimers must be "short,
succinct, and accurate." 24 4 The FDA needs to focus on "the
strength or nature of the evidentiary support for that substancedisease relationship."245 A short, accurate statement regarding
the strength of the evidence is informative for consumers and
not overly burdensome on manufacturers' commercial speech.
Every court that has addressed this issue suggested the
language, "FDA does not approve this claim."2 4 6 Thus far, the
FDA has resisted using this language, perhaps because allowing

240 See, for example, Whitaker, 248 F Supp
2d at 24.
241 Alliance I, 714 F Supp 2d at 72.

242 See, for example, id at 71-72.
243 See Fleminger, 854 F Supp 2d at 217.
244 Pearson II, 130 F Supp 2d at
120.
245 See Alliance II, 786 F Supp 2d at
24 n 22.
2
See, for example, Pearson-I, 164 F3d at 659.
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a manufacturer to make a claim and merely noting that the
FDA does not approve does not seem the most effective way to
prevent consumer fraud. However, if the FDA combines this
disclaimer with other approved language that informs
consumers of the strength of the evidence-such as "very little
scientific evidence," as in Fleminger247-- courts would be more
likely to uphold it.
The following example permits the claim followed by a
short, informative disclaimer: "[Food product or dietary
supplement] may reduce the risk of [specific disease]. The FDA
does not approve this claim because there is very little scientific
evidence for the claim." Here, the first portion permits the
manufacturer to exercise its commercial free speech rights in
making the claim. The second portion incorporates the courtsuggested language with a short, succinct, and accurate
disclaimer evaluating the strength of the evidence. The FDA
could substitute "very little" with different but similarly worded
descriptors reflecting its conclusion about the strength of the
supporting evidence. While manufacturers and the FDA may
continue to disagree over those qualifying words, a strong record
of the FDA's application of the Guidelines and a court that truly
applies the deferential arbitrary and capricious review should
minimize the disagreements and begin to establish a stable body
of case law on which the FDA can rely going forward.
V. CONCLUSION

The FDA's regulation of health claims juxtaposes two
conflicting objectives, preserving commercial free speech and
ensuring consumer protection. Every court that has addressed
the regulation of health claims agrees that the FDA has a
substantial interest in protecting public health and preventing
consumer confusion. 24 8 The courts further agree that the
"FDCA[] and NLEA[] express[ly] grant [] authority to the FDA
to ensure that only truthful and accurate health claims
supported by reliable scientific evidence are permitted in the
marketplace." 2 4 9 If courts utilize the appropriately deferential
arbitrary and capricious review, they not only comply with the

247
248
249

Fleminger, 854 F Supp 2d at 217.
See, for example, Pearson I, 164 F3d at 655-56.
See, for example, Fleminger, 854 F Supp 2d at 209.
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APA but also permit the FDA to exercise its statutory and
regulatory authority to protect consumers from inherently
misleading claims. Pearson I and the district courts' varying
interpretations, when synthesized, provide a path the FDA can
follow in drafting disclaimers for potentially misleading claims.
If the FDA respects manufacturers' commercial free speech
rights by permitting them to make claims and then adds a short
disclaimer noting why it does not endorse the claim, the FDA
can successfully inform consumers of the value of the health
claims on food products and dietary supplements while still
respecting the First Amendment.

